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I. THE AMERICAN HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
Who should be providing mortgage credit to
American
households?
Given
that
the
residential mortgage market is a ten-trilliondollar one, the answer we come up with had
better be right, or we may suffer another
brutal financial crisis sooner than we would
like. Indeed, the stakes are as high as they
*
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article
draws from earlier work of mine, including a comment letter
to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Comment on the Federal
Housing Finance Agency’s Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 20132017,
SOC.
SCI.
RES.
NETWORK
(June
18,
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2086514,
as well as assorted articles and blog posts.
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were in the Great Depression when the
foundation of our current system was first
laid down.
Unfortunately, the housing finance experts
of the 1930s seemed to have a greater clarity
of purpose when designing their housing
finance system. Part of the problem today is
that debates over the housing finance system
have been muddled by broader ideological
battles and entrenched special interests, as
well as by plain old inertia and the fear of
change.
Instead of merely responding to the
latest proposal coming out of Washington,
D.C., it is worth taking a step back to
evaluate the full range of options available
to us.
After all, whatever course we decide
upon will shape the housing market for
generations to come.
In For the Protection of Investors and the
Public:
Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed
Securities Should Be Subject to the Disclosure
Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,
Brent Horton argues that “the best way to
reduce risk taking at Fannie Mae is to subject
its
MBS
offerings
to
the
disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.” 1
I disagree. While disclosure obviously has an
important role to play in the regulation of
publicly
traded
companies,
the
problems
inherent in Fannie Mae’s structure are greater
than those that increased disclosure can
address.
Horton’s article mainly addresses Fannie
Mae, but my views apply equally to its sibling
corporation, Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie
are commonly referred to as governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs). They each have
1. Brent J. Horton, For the Protection of Investors and
the Public:
Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed Securities
Should Be Subject to the Disclosure Requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933, 89 TUL. L. REV. __ (2014).
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a dual mandate that is built into the special
charters given to them by Congress.
On the
one hand, they are supposed to maximize
shareholder
value
as
privately
owned
companies. On the other, they are supposed to
increase home ownership opportunities for lowand moderate-income households and residents
of
underserved
communities.
These
two
missions have been in tension with each other
over the years.
The GSE model resulted in
massive losses for the two companies during
the financial crisis.
Taxpayers bore these
losses until the housing markets recovered,
lifting the GSEs along with them.
In our
postcrisis world, we are left with this
question: what should be done with Fannie and
Freddie?
II. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

WITH

FANNIE

AND

FREDDIE?

There are four broad positions regarding
the appropriate role of Fannie and Freddie in
the housing finance market. First, Fannie and
Freddie are generally doing the job that they
were designed to do, although their powers and
those of their regulators should be tweaked.
Second, Fannie and Freddie are generally doing
their job, but they do not do enough to
promote
their
affordable
housing
goals.
Third,
Fannie
and
Freddie
should
be
nationalized because the federal government
has taken on most of the risk associated with
them already. And finally, Fannie and Freddie
should be privatized because they pose a
systemic risk to the financial system.
This Response takes the fourth position.
In particular, it argues that the GSEs’
special
relationship
with
the
federal
government should be terminated and the two
companies should be privatized.
Until they
entered conservatorship, this position had
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been
considered
a
political
nonstarter,
particularly because Fannie and Freddie have
many allies in the Democratic and Republican
parties.
Due to recent events, this is now
one of the options on the table for a
postconservatorship Fannie and Freddie.
A. Tweaking the Status Quo
One taking the first view—that Fannie and
Freddie are generally doing the job that they
were designed to do—might argue that we should
just come to terms with the fact that the
government is already enmeshed in private
markets and there is no reason to do things
any differently in the context of housing
finance.
As such, there is no need to rock
the boat when it comes to companies that are
as enmeshed with the federal government as are
Fannie and Freddie.
Horton himself takes this view, arguing
that politics is the art of the attainable or,
in the words of Otto von Bismarck, of “the
Horton writes, “The next best
next best.” 2
does not require dismantling Fannie Mae; the
next best is to require Fannie Mae to inform
investors—and
the
public—more
about
the
mortgages it is purchasing and securitizing.” 3
His proposal thus joins a long line of reform
proposals that seek to tweak the status quo
and argue that there is no need to extricate
the federal government from its complicated
relationship with Fannie or Freddie.
If Horton had written this article before
the financial crisis, before Fannie and
Freddie had gone into conservatorship, I might
find his proposal more intriguing.
But the
2. Id. at __ (quoting Otto von Bismarck, quoted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 530 (Margaret Miner & Hugh
Rawson eds., 2d ed. 2006)).
3. Id. at __.
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political winds have shifted substantially,
such
that
“the
next
best”
thing
is
qualitatively
better
than
increased
disclosure.
The
crisis
has
given
us
permission to think more broadly about what
our housing finance system should look like
going forward.
B. Increasing Fannie’s Role in Developing
Affordable Housing
Horton is also sympathetic to the argument
that Fannie and Freddie are essential in
efforts to place home ownership “within reach
Some argue that the GSEs’ dualof all.” 4
mandate model is valuable because it ensures
that private capital has a duty to serve lowand moderate-income households.
Indeed, much
of the opposition to GSE reform from Democrats
in Congress arises from this concern over the
future of the “duty to serve.”
Private
capital has a history of overlooking certain
segments of the mortgage market, and a duty to
serve would ensure that it does not do so
going forward.
Democrats in particular have
also favored the funding of a housing trust
fund to provide capital dollars for the
construction of affordable housing for lowincome households.
These two policy objectives—the duty to
serve and a housing trust fund—have encouraged
some affordable housing advocates to favor
some variant of the status quo, because the
status quo can clearly deliver those two
objectives. The problem with this approach is
the same as with the first:
Fannie and
Freddie’s dual mandates are in inherent
tension with each other, and no tweak can
resolve that tension.
Indeed, the precrisis
4. Id. at __ (quoting WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS
PAPERS 172 (Walter Scott 1888)).

AND

OTHER
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GSEs put the interests of shareholders and
management over the public interest. The GSEs
also were some of the most politically
powerful
entities
in
Washington,
D.C.
Stronger medicine than mere tweaks is needed
to protect the nation from restoring the GSEs
to their precrisis size and power and also the
real risks that are attendant in doing so.
C. Nationalization
In recent years, the federal government has
insured
or
guaranteed
80%-90%
of
new
residential
mortgages
through
its
instrumentality,
the
Federal
Housing
Administration (FHA), as well as through
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for which it is
the conservator.
Some believe that the
federal government is the only entity that can
provide mortgage credit in a stable way, and
history is arguably on their side. Since the
Great Depression, when the Home Owners Loan
Corporation, the FHA, and Fannie Mae were
created, the federal government has had a
central role in the housing finance market.
Some also believe that there is not enough
private capital to replace the governmentguaranteed capital in the market, even if
there was sufficient political will to do so.
Nationalization proposals are just seen as the
natural extension of this state of affairs.
A variety of scholars and think tanks have
proposed
versions
of
a
nationalized
or
partially nationalized housing finance system
with a utilitylike securitizer at its heart.
The bipartisan Johnson-Crapo housing finance
reform bill contained aspects of a utilitylike
securitizer. 5 Bills like this appear dead in

5

Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act
of 2014, S.1217, 113th Cong. § 321-327 (2014).
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the water, however, with congressional reform
not expected for years.
The GSEs’ regulator, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), has taken some steps in
the direction of nationalization with its
common securitization platform. This platform
seeks to combine the back-office functions of
Fannie and Freddie into one entity.
This
regulatory initiative may have more impact in
the long run than those of the current donothing Congress.
Whether led by regulators
or Congress, if GSE reform settles on a single
guarantor model, it is likely that model will
be regulated like a utility company.
This approach gives up on the notion that
the private sector should be in the lead
position of evaluating mortgages and bearing
the risk of loss from underwriting them. This
is inconsistent with what we know of how
markets should work.
Generally, it is
considered appropriate for the government to
step into the market if there is a market
failure.
Market failures in the housing
markets typically fall into two categories:
those caused by excessive information costs
and those caused by uninsurable risks. 6 Given
that market players have access to an
extraordinarily detailed level of information
about borrowers (reduced to a simple FICO
score)
and
homes
(through
mandatory
appraisals), a market failure would appear to
have to result from uninsurable risks.
As
noted, some have argued that there is not
enough private capital to support the entire
6. David Reiss, Landlords of Last Resort:
Should the
Government Subsidize the Mortgages of Privately-Owned, Small
Multifamily Buildings?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 940 (2009)
(quoting James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework
for Evaluating Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily
Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 151, 154
(1995)).
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U.S. mortgage market. Even if that were true,
however, there is no theoretical reason why
private capital should not be in a first-loss
position for large swaths of that market. And
it is important to remember what is at stake:
if government funds are in the first-loss
position, then taxpayers are stuck holding the
bag at the end of each bust.
D. Privatization
Some, including me, believe that private
capital can, and should, take a bigger role in
the provision of residential mortgage finance.
There is some question as to how much capacity
private capital has, given the size of the
residential mortgage market. But there is no
doubt that private capital can do more than
the measly share of new mortgages that it has
been originating in recent years.
The longterm health of the U.S. housing finance system
is best assured by having private capital
assume as much of the credit risk as it can
responsibly handle.
It follows that Fannie
and Freddie’s functions should be transferred
to the private sector pursuant to a carefully
planned transition.
III. A HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
CENTURY

FOR THE

TWENTY-FIRST

A housing finance system for the twentyfirst century should achieve three goals:
(1) put private capital in a first-loss
position,
(2) ensure
that
the
federal
government can act as a lender of last resort
for the mortgage market, and (3) maintain an
ongoing role for the federal government in the
segments of the market that private capital
does not sufficiently fund.
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A. Private Capital
The government’s goal for the private
housing finance market should be to provide
sustainable credit to the wide swath of
borrowers who have ready access to private
financial institutions.
The private housing
finance industry’s share of the conforming
market
should
expand
over
time
as
it
demonstrates
its
ability
to
responsibly
increase
the
availability
of
sustainable
credit.
This can be achieved by a gradual
lowering of the conforming loan limits that
are applicable to Fannie and Freddie.
This private capital should also be subject
to consumer protection regulation to ensure
that it is not put to predatory uses.
The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rules
in place to provide such consumer protection.
It will also be important to continue to
monitor
whether
lowand
moderate-income
households and neighborhoods are receiving
sufficient amounts of mortgage credit.
The
federal government may need to take additional
steps to overcome any market failure in
submarkets in order to ensure that all
communities have access to a vibrant mortgage
market.
While it is important to make residential
credit broadly available, lenders will be
doing borrowers no favors if their loans are
not sustainable.
The federal government
should come up with a metric that balances
responsible
underwriting
with
access
to
credit.
Developing a metric is important
because of the pressure to increase access to
residential mortgage credit by a range of
players—consumer
advocates,
lenders,
and
politicians, to name just a few.
But credit
that cannot be sustained by home owners leads
to mortgage default and foreclosure.
Home
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owners should not be taking out mortgages with
payments that they cannot consistently make
year in and year out.
B. Liquidity
The FHA, along with the rest of the
government-supported sector of the housing
finance market, should always be ready to
provide liquidity during a financial crisis.
This means that the government’s housing
finance infrastructure should be able to ramp
up almost immediately if private credit were
to disappear overnight.
C. Affordable and Sustainable Mortgages
The
FHA
should
continue
to
provide
mortgages to first-time home buyers and lowand moderate-income borrowers. But otherwise,
we should look to private capital to price
risk and fund mortgages to the extent that it
can do so.
And as with privately funded
loans, the FHA should ensure that the
mortgages they originate are sustainable for
their borrowers.
These
three
components—appropriatelyregulated private capital in a first-loss
position, the federal government as a lender
of last resort, and a government role in the
segment of the market that private capital
does not sufficiently fund—give us a housing
finance system that may last through the end
of the twenty-first century.
IV. THE RISK

OF

DOING NOTHING

Horton rightly notes that the reform of
GSEs like Fannie is the biggest “piece of
unfinished business” left over from the
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financial crisis. 7 Our do-nothing Congress is
aware that the residential mortgage market we
create today will likely be the one our
grandchildren use.
Congress is also aware
that we have, at most, one chance to get it
right.
We can only hope that the political
will to reform the GSEs can overcome Congress’
deep ideological divide before we hit our next
housing finance crisis, whatever and whenever
that might be.
And yet, there is no question that the
federal
government
has
not
moved
with
sufficient speed to establish a workable
infrastructure for the housing finance market.
Some commentators identify benefits of a slow
approach—time to get consensus, time to get
rules right, time for trial and error before
committing for the long term.
Few identify
the costs of regulatory uncertainty—failure to
get buy-in for capital-intensive ventures,
atrophy of existing resources, and limited
investor interest.
I believe that there is a good chance that
five or ten years from now, Fannie and Freddie
will be in the midst of another bailout. This
next crisis will be directly caused by the
executive and legislative branches of the
federal government. Members of those branches
may say, “Nobody could have known that this
crisis was going to happen, nobody is at
fault.”
That will not be true, but nobody
will be punished in any case. That is because
the crisis will result from inaction, the most
fearsome of government flaws.
Fannie and Freddie have been in a state of
limbo since they entered conservatorship in
7. Horton, supra note 1, at __ (quoting Nick Timiraos,
Five Years Later, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Remain Unfinished
Business,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
6,
2013,
8:04
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323423804
579022672911329450).
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2008.
The conservatorships have gone on for
far too long for such complex entities to
remain well-run.
All sorts of operational
risks are likely to be cropping up in the two
companies as employees sit around (or walk out
the door) waiting for Congress to act.
Fannie and Freddie’s regulator, the Federal
Housing
Finance
Agency
(FHFA),
can
administratively move housing finance reform
forward to some extent on its own.
To the
extent that it does so, it needs to determine
how safety and soundness are best balanced
with access to credit.
Federal housing
finance policy typically goes off the rails
when those two goals get mixed up. The FHFA
should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness
goals are clearly set forth and that other
goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to
work in harmony with them.
V. CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, the federal government needs
to determine what the housing finance system
should look like for the twenty-first century.
There is not one right answer to that
question.
There is also an ideological
component to the answer.
I believe that a
broad swath of the populace favors a system in
which
private
capital
(albeit
heavily
regulated private capital) should be put at
risk for a large swath of residential
mortgages. Moreover, I believe that there is
a broad consensus that the taxpayer should
only be on the hook for major liquidity crises
and
for
initiatives
that
provide
home
ownership opportunities to low- and moderateincome households.
I believe that a broad
swath of the electorate would stand behind
such a plan whether it was initiated by the
Obama Administration or by Congress.
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Too much of the debate about our housing
finance system is driven by fear of change,
often
expressed
as
concerns
about
the
transition from our current system to whatever
comes next. But we need to make clear what we
want from our new system and then design it
and the transition to get there.
If we do
not, we will end up with the “next, next best”
option. We should do better than that.

